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abstract:  As the migrant crisis escalates at Europe’s borders, the Gulf States have been blamed for hav-
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measures destined to facilitate the entry and stay of Syrians since 2011. 
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a Note on Syrian refugees in the Gulf:
attempting to assess Data and policies
Françoise De Bel-Air
A s the migrant crisis escalates at Europe’s borders, the Gulf States have been blamed for having offered “zero resettlement” to Syrian refugees escaping from the conflict.1  In response, the Saudi Foreign Ministry claimed that “Saudi Arabia has hosted around 2.5 million Syrians since the 
beginning of the crisis in that country in 2011” and that “a total of 100,000 Syrian students are regis-
tered in public schools.”2 The UAE government said “it has provided residency permits to more than 
100,000 Syrians who have entered the country since 2011 and that more than 242,000 Syrian nationals 
currently live in the country.”3 Kuwait also claimed that it had granted long-term residency permits to 
Syrian nationals.4 
The GCC states are not signatories to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol and, thus, do not recognise “refugees” as a legal category. Moreover, expatriates in the 
region are considered “guests” on short-duration visit visas, or temporary contract workers (of whom 
only a fraction have a right to family reunion). Therefore, GCC governments’ claims raise the following 
questions:
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- Can these statements be sustained by available demographic data?
- Are there figures indicating that the GCC countries relaxed their entry and residency rules from 
2011 to allow more Syrians into their territory than the average flow of workers and dependents? 
- Did these countries enforce measures to support Syrian nationals fleeing the conflict?
The paper attempts to answer these questions, using statistics available from the Gulf countries 
as well as declarations from official bodies released in the local press. It has to be said that data broken 
down by single nationality are not readily available in most Gulf States: this kind of information may 
be perceived as sensitive politically. First, foreign nationals make up between a 33 and 88 per cent of 
Gulf States’ resident populations,5 and outnumber nationals in all but two of the countries. Second, 
some foreign nationalities may also outnumber other national groups (e.g. Indians in the UAE, Nepalis 
in Qatar). Most Gulf States do not provide the nationality breakdown of their migrant populations or 
only release partial figures (workers only, selected nationalities, for instance). Finding alternative sources 
of reliable information is also difficult. Sending countries cannot keep exact records of their departing 
citizens by destination and cannot follow up on their return, remigration, and other movements under 
general circumstances, let alone in a civil war. On the receiving end, foreign embassies are usually not ac-
curately informed of the exact numbers of their nationals residing in a given country: these may not wish 
to be recorded, neglect or avoid signalling their departure. Embassies, in general, have to resort to the 
authorities of the receiving country to evaluate the numbers and characteristics of their nationals. In the 
Gulf States, moreover, Syrian ambassadors were expelled following the decision of the six GCC member 
countries to close their embassies in Damascus in February 2012.6 Syrian representation in Qatar was 
later handed over to the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), a group opposed to the Assad regime.7 The 
embassy was supposed to first deal with the administrative needs of Syrians in Qatar before extending 
its mandate to Syrian expatriates in other Gulf countries mid-2015.8 
Against this backdrop, it nevertheless appears that, besides being major aid donors to Arab coun-
tries sheltering Syrian refugees,9 most Gulf States have passed various measures destined to facilitate 
the entry and stay of Syrians since 2011. However, the paucity of data available on single nationalities 
in Gulf States’ published statistics (in the present case, on Syrian nationals) affects available evidence of 
the exact impact of such measures on the actual flows and stocks of Syrians received in the Gulf region 
as refugees from the Syrian conflict. 
Saudi arabia
1.1. Stock Data
Data on resident foreign nationals in Saudi Arabia are not broken down by country of citizenship in any 
publication, either from the Central Department for Statistics and Information (CDSI) in population 
Censuses, Labour Force Surveys, Demographic Surveys, or in the statistics available from the Ministries 
of Labour, Education, Interior, etc.  
Press sources have published estimates of Syrian nationals residing in the country ranging from 
500,000,10,11  to 700,00012 and even one million.13 However, such figures are not supported by any avail-
able official data, nor are the sources given by those who publish the data. 
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Using the figure of 100,000 Syrian students14 whom Saudi authorities claim they enrolled in the 
country’s public schools, and under the reasonable assumption that their families accompanied Syrian 
schoolchildren, an estimate can be drawn of the Syrian nationals composing these families. The Syrian 
Population Census of 2010 provides a distribution of the population residing in Syria at the time of the 
census, broken down by five-year age groups.15 The categories aged 5 to 15 made up 24 per cent of the 
total population and 23.3 per cent of the urban population. Considering for the sake of comparison, that 
the 100,000 Syrian schoolchildren are within the 5 to 15 years age bracket, the total number of Syrian 
nationals in these families can be estimated at around 420,000 persons.16 However, this remains a mini-
mal estimate, as 1) some Syrians may be enrolled in private education for which no data by citizenship is 
available and 2) some Syrians in Saudi Arabia may be without school-age children. On the other hand, 
a share of these nationals from Syria may be Syrian spouses of Saudi citizens.
1.2. Flow Data
Statistics available on flows of foreign nationals to and from Saudi Arabia are not broken down by citi-
zenship. This is the case for residency and labour visas or permits statistics, Hajj statistics pertaining to 
pilgrims from outside Saudi Arabia, or, for that matter, newly enrolled school and university students, for 
instance. For example, the annual flows of Syrian workers to Saudi Arabia are impossible to estimate. The 
Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provided statements defending the Saudi role in receiving refu-
gees, only publishes aggregate statistics on visas delivered. It should be noted, moreover, that the Saudi 
embassy in Damascus is closed. Syrians willing to travel to Saudi Arabia have to apply for visas from 
the Saudi embassies in Beirut, Amman, or Ankara, which do not publish any records of visas delivered. 
The exception to this rule is the yearly Saudi records of entries and exits, which count all move-
ments at the country’s borders for any kind of purpose and duration: entry for/exit after long-term 
residency as worker or family dependent, short-term visit, pilgrimage, etc. Entries and exit statistics, 
unfortunately, ceased being published by country of citizenship after 2013.
table 1: records of entries and exits of Syrian nationals at Saudi borders (2010-2013)
According to the entry and exit figures, Saudi Arabia received 3,147,350 Syrian nationals between 
2011 and 2013. However, the numbers of exits are relatively similar and the net migration figure for the 
period (entries - exits) amounts to no more than 138,640 persons. A significant surplus of arrivals over 
departures is especially noticeable in 2012 (82,000 persons). Witness accounts confirmed that Saudi 
Arabia’s relatively leniency in allowing Syrians into the country, had changed in the first months of 2013: 
2010 2011 2012 2013
Cumulative
flows 
2011-2013
Net migration 10,036 34,467 81,953 22,220 138,640
Exits 1,586,058 1,299,071 965,288 744,351 3,008,710
Entries 1,596,094 1,333,538 1,047,241 766,571 3,147,350
Source: CDSI Statistical Yearbooks, 2011 to 2014. Date of reference: December 31, given years.
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authorities were said to have “stopped family visas, and at times opening it for certain jobs like medicine 
and only if the Syrian is going to a certain city like Riyadh.”17 
Moreover, the parallel evolution of entries and exits (Fig. 1) suggests a dominant pattern of regular, 
short-term stays until 2011, most likely for visits as well as pilgrimage purposes. Yet, figures drop after 
2010: this may mean that the entry of Syrians to Saudi Arabia has become, all in all, more difficult since 
2011. Since 2012, indeed, Syrians are said to have been denied Hajj visas, for instance.18 
Figure 1: Entries, exits and net migration of Syrian nationals to Saudi arabia (2006-2013)
In general, figures of entries and exits of Syrian nationals to and from Saudi Arabia suggest that 
entries have become more difficult since the start of the war, but movements have not stopped. Moreover, 
some Syrians who entered have stayed in the country since 2011.
A comparison between the cross-border movements of Syrian nationals and other Arab nation-
alities (Fig. 2) may also imply that nationals from countries at war were affected differently by the 
mass deportation campaign that took place in November 2013. The announcement of the departure of 
300,000 Egyptians during the regularisation and deportation campaign is validated in the vast surplus 
of Egyptian exits over entries in 2013. Yet, this is not the case for Sudanese and Yemenis,19 whose net 
migration rates remain positive like those of Syrians. This could provide support to the Saudi authorities’ 
claims that they implemented some measures protecting refugees, among them Syrians.
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Figure 2: Net migration to Saudi arabia (selected arab countries, 2006-2013)
1.3. Measures taken in Favour of Syrians Forcibly Displaced to Saudi arabia
Saudi Arabia has received waves of “refugees” in the past, some claiming to stay on the basis of religious 
solidarity such as the Uzbeks and Uighurs fleeing communism, from the 1930s to the 1950s. In the 
1990s, the KSA hosted about 35,000 Iraqi refugees in the Rafha camp and even signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with UNHCR to deal with these refugees.20 The Kingdom also hosts vast 
communities of Palestinians, Somalis, Burmese (Rohingyas), Sudanese, etc. These populations fleeing 
conflicts generally used the employment channels, or overstayed pilgrimage, visit to relatives, or tour-
ist visas. When foreign residents in irregular situation were targeted by crackdown campaigns, ongoing 
since 2013, exceptions were made. Burmese (Rohingyas), Palestinian and Syrian21 residents were for-
mally exempted from deportation if found contravening labour and residency regulations. 
Other protective measures aimed at Syrians have been announced in Saudi Arabia since 2012: a 
royal order issued in 2012, for instance, allows Syrian children to study in Saudi schools. All Syrians in 
the Kingdom are said to receive free medical treatment.22 They are also allowed to work in the private 
sector like other expatriates.23 
The “Programme of the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines for the Syrian Students” was an-
nounced in 2012. It orders universities to incorporate up to 3,000 Syrian university students per year free 
of charge in Saudi public universities, under a quota system.24 The programme clearly stated it would be 
conditional to the continuation of the conflict and, therefore, re-examined every year. It also restricted 
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applications to Syrian students having valid entry visas and of certain age categories only. However, it 
seems that the programme was continued under the new Saudi King’s rule.25 
In December 2014, another decision was announced,26 allowing Syrians to stay in the country 
without iqamas (residency permits) as long as their visit, Hajj, or Umrah visas are valid. They would have, 
however, to correct their status later. The measure is limited to Syrian visitors holding a valid entry visa.27 
To sum up, it can be said that available data are not detailed enough to support the claim by Saudi 
Arabia that it received 2.5 million Syrians forcibly displaced by the conflict. Flow data would even 
support statements suggesting that Saudi Arabia has not encouraged entry of Syrians since 2011, even 
though it exempted stranded Syrians from deportation. However, the several measures announced in 
the press do support statements by Saudi officials that they did receive a number of refugees from Syria. 
An estimate of Syrian nationals who have arrived in Saudi Arabia since 2011 stands perhaps around 
420,000. This is a minimal estimate, for it fails to incorporate Syrian refugees who came with no school-
age children.
Saudi Arabia is also a major donor of aid to the Syrian refugees. “The country has contributed 
$117.6m to the UNHCR budget since 2011: in 2013, it was the 19th largest contributor globally. The 
private sector added another $2.1m, with billionaire investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal al-Saud’s foun-
dation a major donor.”28 
Kuwait
Kuwait publishes only some data by country of citizenship of residents. Among these are the records of 
entries and exits. As in the case of Saudi Arabia, this source indicates that cumulative flows of Syrian 
nationals to Kuwait since the start of the war are positive, at 18,114 persons. Kuwait thus did receive 
Syrian nationals, and the net flows actually peaked in 2012.
table 2: records of entries and exits of Syrian nationals at Kuwaiti borders (2010-2013)
As for the stocks of resident population, records of foreign residents maintained by the Public Au-
thority for Civil Information (PACI) are considered more accurate than census-based figures released 
by the Central Statistical Office of the Ministry of Planning (Shah, 2010: 15). PACI is an independent 
governmental body in charge of maintaining a population register based upon which it issues civil iden-
tification cards to all residents. PACI data provide estimates of the Syrian population on December 31, 
for the years 2009, 2011 and 2012,29 and on June 30, 2015 (Table 3).
2010 2011 2012 2013
Cumulative
flows 
2011-2013
Net migration 633 667 9,188 7,626 18,114
Exits 307,316 268,346 218,241 191,830 985,733
Entries 307,949 269,013 227,429 199,456 1,003,847
Source: Annual Bulletin of Transports and Communication, CSB, 2010 to 2013
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As presented in Table 3 and Fig. 3, the stocks of Syrian residents in Kuwait can, therefore, be 
estimated using two sets of sources: PACI data on resident Syrian nationals, on the one hand; and the 
records of entries and exits (net migration), completed by births and deaths records (natural increase), 
on the other.
table 3 and Figure 3: Evaluations of the stocks of Syrian residents in Kuwait:
paCI data compared to flows-based estimates (2010 to mid-2015)
According to PACI, 131,115 Syrian nationals resided in Kuwait as of December 31, 2009 before 
the war broke out. It appears, on the basis of these numbers, that PACI data (employing residencies 
delivered to foreign residents), probably underestimate the total stocks of Syrians who have arrived in 
Kuwait since then. The discrepancy between the two sources is especially marked for 2012 (14,032 Syr-
ian nationals). The other figures (based on entries and exits’  flows) are higher because they include Syrian 
nationals who entered, and later remained, on short duration tourist or visit visas, and did not apply for 
residency. 
As of April 2012, more stringent security screenings started being applied to Syrian nationals. The 
Kuwaiti government continued allowing Syrian nationals already residing in Kuwait to sponsor their 
Syrian children for entry visas and residence permits, but this accommodation became limited to girls 
under the age of 15 and boys under the age of 10.30 However, the hike in net migration figures and hence 
of stocks based on these data for 2012 shows that family reunion schemes were widely used. The inward 
movements continued during 2013, but at a slower pace.
In September 2015, a representative of the General Directorate for Residency Affairs in Kuwait’s 
Interior Ministry announced that Syrian nationals would be granted extensions of residency so that they 
were not deported because of administrative problems. Cases include those whose contracts had ended 
and those who cannot renew residency permits because they could not renew their expired passports or 
because they could not present required documents. Syrian nationals who entered Kuwait on visit visas, 
but were not able to leave in due time, were granted long-term visas.31  
PACI 
data
Estimates based on flows
Net 
migration
Nat. 
increase (a) Total
Dec. 2009 131,115 131,115
Dec. 2010 633 2,424 134,172
Dec. 2011 132,001 667 2,746 137,585
Dec. 2012 135,554 9,188 2,813 149,586
Dec. 2013 7,626 2,984 160,196
June 2015 155,000
Sources: PACI data; Annual Bulletin of Transports and 
Communication, CSB, 2010 to 2013 and Annual Bulletin for Vital 
Statistics, CSB, 2010 to 2013 
(a) Births records are published by country of nationality
but deaths are only published by groups of countries of
origin (Arabs, Asians, etc.). As the Syrians made 18 per
cent of all Arabs in 2012, the figures for Syrian deaths
were estimated as making up 18 per cent of the
aggregate figures of Arabs’ deaths.     
115,000
120,000
125,000
130,000
135,000
140,000
145,000
150,000
155,000
160,000
165,000
115,000
120,000
125,000
130,000
135,000
140,000
145,000
150,000
155,000
160,000
D
ec. 2009
D
ec. 2010
D
ec. 2011
D
ec. 2012
D
ec. 2013
June 2015
B
ased on net flow
s
PA
C
I d
at
a
PACI data Net migration+Natural increase
Françoise De Bel-Air
Gulf  Labour Markets and Migration10
As of June 30, 2015, PACI estimated that there were almost 155,000 Syrian residents. Figures 
based on flows, available until December 31, 2013, were consistently higher than the PACI ones at 
similar dates. The total of Syrian nationals in Kuwait may thus be slightly higher than 155,000 and 
include persons residing without residency documents. Therefore, the statements of Kuwaiti authorities 
that they do not take in new Syrian refugees but refrain from deporting expired residency and visit visa 
overstayers32  seem plausible, in the light of available data.33 Moreover, granting residencies to holders of 
short-term visas or overstayers is a very important decision, as it should allow many children in irregular 
situation to enrol legally in Kuwait’s school system. 
United arab Emirates
In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), no data on foreign nationals’ stocks and flows has been made 
available by country of citizenship since the end of the 2000s. However, the Emirati Ministry of La-
bour published some figures of registered workers by nationality until 2007: Syrian nationals employed 
in the private sector numbered 59,650 that year.34 In order to draw an estimate of all Syrian nationals 
(including inactive family members), and in the absence of any indication of the ratio of worker to fam-
ily dependent in the UAE, we use data available for Kuwait in 2009.35 These provide a breakdown of all 
resident populations, by migration status (worker, family member, student, etc.) and country of citizen-
ship. In Kuwait, in 2009, Syrians numbered 131,115, of whom 57,535 were classified as workers. The 
multiplier between workers and total figures is therefore: 2.28. Assuming that family reunion policies 
and behaviours are identical for Syrians in Kuwait and the UAE, which is not certain, an estimate of the 
total Syrian population in the UAE in 2007 would be: 59,650*2.28=136,002. This estimate is unverifi-
able, however, and concerns only workers in the private sector and their dependents.
However, if we assume that the numbers of Syrian nationals did not change with the financial crisis 
of 2008, this figure of 136,000 Syrians in the late 2000s becomes credible: it matches the declaration 
by UAE officials that prior to the conflict, the country was hosting 140,000 Syrians. Responding to an 
article in The New York Times that accused the Gulf nations of “tepid response” to the migration crisis, the 
UAE Ambassador to the US stated that 100,000 new entrants had been received since the start of the 
conflict, joining 140,000 of their compatriots already residing in the UAE since before 2011.36 Provided 
the estimates supplied by the UAE authorities are valid, an increase of 100,000 persons over the course 
of four years (mid-2011 to mid-2013), from 142,000 to 242,000 Syrians, constitutes a 13 percent rate 
of increase annually. This rate is high enough to support the claim that some avenues were opened to 
accommodate Syrians in priority.
That said, in the absence of data on UAE residents by country of citizenship for recent years, the 
Emirati government’s claim that it granted residency permits to about 100,000 new Syrian residents 
cannot be verified. Moreover, it is impossible to determine if these 100,000 Syrians entered as labourers 
with or without family dependents, or if the UAE’s residency policy has been relaxed to permit them en-
try into the country. Indeed, recent witness accounts indicate that it is now “very difficult” for families of 
Syrian residents in the UAE to visit GCC countries.37 Employers there also confirm that hiring a Syrian 
is also “almost impossible.”38 Other witnesses stated that UAE authorities favoured certain professions 
and profiles (“white collar”) over others (those in “blue collar” categories).39 This has serious implications: 
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persons residing without a valid long-term residence and work permit for instance, cannot enrol their 
children in local schools, besides being themselves unable to work and earn a living wage.  
Nevertheless, the UAE claim to be the biggest donor to the cause of the Syrian refugees. According 
to the Financial Times, as of September 2015, “the UAE government gave $10.7m to the UNHCR with 
the private sector adding another $17.1m. A UAE official says in total it has donated $38m through 
bilateral aid since 2011”.40 Since the onset of the crisis, the UAE also provided over Dh4 billion (around 
$1.1 billion) in support of the Syrian people, of which a total of $581.5 million went to humanitarian 
assistance. Among the projects funded are the Mrajeeb Al Fhood refugee camp in Jordan, home to 
around 6,500 Syrian refugees and the UAE-Jordanian field hospital in Al Mafraq which provided nearly 
a half-million treatments. $72 million more was allocated to support refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Iraq and Turkey.41 
Qatar
In January 2013, Qatar received the first batch of 42 Syrian refugees from Lebanon. The refugees in-
cluded widows and families and were received as special guests of the Emir. They were already being 
assisted by Qatar while in Lebanon and would be fully provided for once they arrived in the country.42 
Qatar is one of the most vocal critics of President Bashar Al-Assad. The country donated millions 
of dollars in humanitarian aid for refugees and is reportedly arming rebel forces in Syria.43 Therefore, 
some Syrian families found a shelter in Doha. However, due to security concerns, Qatar limited business, 
work and visitor visas for Syrians during the war. Moreover, no support programmes are available to as-
sist the “refugees”. According to an article in the Doha News,
“Qatar has[…] allowed Syrians who were already sponsored and working here to bring in their 
relatives. However, these applications are approved on a case-by-case basis and can take months to 
process, as embassy and government officials investigate whether the applicant poses a security risk, 
among other factors. Once in Qatar, the Syrians are granted a visitor visa that can be renewed inside 
the country for QR200, exempting them from leaving Qatar and coming back, as many other long-
term “visitors” must do, embassy officials said. This appears to be a change from 2013, when many 
visitors reported having to go off the grid once their visitor visas expired. […] However, the inability 
to work on a visitor visa means many Syrians in Qatar face financial hardships, due to the high cost 
of living. Last year, representatives of the Syrian embassy in Qatar,[said] there are more than 40,000 
Syrian expats living here with residency permits. The number of Syrians on visitor visas is more than 
20,000, including men, women and children.”44 
The claim is unverifiable due to lack of relevant and reliable statistics.
In any case, their parents’ situation also has unfortunate consequences for Syrian children. As Qa-
tar’s Supreme Education Council (Ministry of Education) forbids students without residency permits 
from attending schools in Qatar, Syrian children on temporary visas cannot enrol there; the Syrian 
School in Doha is more lenient as regards residency situation but cannot accommodate all applications.45 
In spite of this situation inside Qatar, the country provides generously for refugee education abroad. 
Charity organisations such as Qatar Charity are also active in supporting displaced Syrians inside Syria, 
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Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey, for example.46 Qatar donated $26.6m, and another $20.9m has come from 
the private sector. 47 
Bahrain 
Figure 4: Net migration flows of Syrian nationals to Bahrain (2006-2012)
As regards Bahrain, data indicate that Syrians were received in every increasing numbers into the coun-
try from the period the conflict started. The year 2012 (the last year for which statistics are available) 
witnesses a highly positive net migration flow. 
Bi-yearly data records of workers and their dependents published by Bahrain’s Expat Management 
System also clearly indicate that the flow of Syrian workers to the Kingdom fluctuated at the begin-
ning of the conflict and has stalled since 2014. Yet dependents have been joining the resident workers 
in growing numbers since 2013.48 Although no mention of such a policy could be found in the press or 
elsewhere, Bahrain did probably facilitate the entry of Syrian dependents as a way to grant them protec-
tion from the conflict.
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Figure 5: Numbers of Syrian workers and dependents residing in Bahrain 
(Dec. 2012-June 2015) 
 In mid-2012, as Bahrain was conducting support activities in a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, 
the Bahraini opposition claimed that Bahrain was actually attempting to naturalise thousands of Sunni 
Syrian refugees, in a bid to alter the Kingdom’s demographic balance in favour of the Sunnis. Bahrain’s 
government vigorously denied the statements made by the opposition.49 Such political sensitivities spe-
cific to Bahrain may explain the lack of publicisation of the opening of borders to Syrian refugees from 
the conflict. Apart from state assistance targeted at Syrian refugees abroad, charity operations are also 
organised in the country to collect funds and in-kind donations to help the Syrians.
oman
Oman did not declare that it had received Syrians as refugees from the conflict. In general, the Sultanate 
has only hosted small numbers of Syrian expatriate workers over the years.50 Nevertheless, vast charity 
operations in favour of the victims of the conflict have been organised since the war broke out, under pri-
vate as well as governmental initiatives.51 The Sultanate’s government is also a major aid donor to victims 
of the conflict in other Middle Eastern states hosting Syrian refugees, coordinated by the Ministry of 
Social Development Affairs. Oman Charitable Organisation (OCO) helped raise as much as $13 mil-
lion in one single campaign called “Donation for Syria” in 2013. Oman Charitable Organisation was also 
a prominent contributor to the setting up and equipment of Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan and it has 
been “determined to continue with the humanitarian assistance programme till the end of the crisis.”52 
Conclusion
This paper is a work in progress. As of today, a response to the first question explored in the paper (“Can 
these statements be sustained by available demographic data?”), would be negative. The scarce  data avail-
able on Syrian nationals in each Gulf country are not detailed enough to allow us to accurately measure 
the size and structure of flows of Syrian nationals pushed into the GCC as a direct effect of the conflict. 
The statement by Saudi Arabia is, especially, impossible to verify due to lack of data. 
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For the same reason, it is difficult to provide evidence in answer to question 2: “Are there figures 
indicating that the GCC countries relaxed their entry and residency rules from 2011 to allow more Syr-
ians into their territory than the average flow of workers and dependents?” We do not know for certain 
(except in the case of Bahrain) how many, and who are the Syrians who entered Gulf countries since the 
start of the conflict, in terms of age, sex, profession and migration status. As for question 3 (“Did these 
countries enforce measures to support Syrian nationals fleeing the conflict?”), a broad answer could be 
that some support measures were tailored for the Syrians, such as protection from deportation, exemp-
tion from residency renewal, and some access to free education and health. In view of the grave conse-
quences of being irregular for families (impossibility to work and to provide for livelihoods, as well as the 
impossibility of enrolling children at school), any operation of regularisation is welcome. 
From the evidence available, our conclusion has thus to remain limited in scope. Besides being 
major donors to Syrian refugees in Syria and in neighbouring countries, Gulf States 1) have continued 
attracting Syrian workers, and may have facilitated family reunions; 2) have enforced social protection 
and residency facilitation measures for Syrian residents, those who entered before 2011 and could not 
return, and those who entered since 2011, because of the conflict. 
A detailed discussion of the reasons behind the silence surrounding Gulf States’ action towards 
Syrians inside the region (until September 2015) is beyond the scope of this paper. Many concerns may 
well be at interplay, among with them the demographic imbalance (nationals being a minority inside 
their country) as well as keeping a “national preference” for Gulf nationals on the labour market at times 
of politico-economic tensions due to dropping oil prices.53 However, as some Gulf States are frontline 
actors in the Syrian conflict, security is certainly a massive concern. The risk of infiltration of activists 
undertaking terrorist attacks or sedition is taken very seriously. The political affiliation of Syrian “guest” 
nationals is, therefore, the object of stringent and lengthy control measures. These are hard to reconcile 
with official statements claiming Gulf States and societies’ solidarity with the Syrian people.
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